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REPLY BRIEF
Initially, Appellant acknowledges that the Respondent, in his Brief, makes two valid
points. One is that Appellant failed to include the page numbers in two of his cites, for which
Appellant apologizes.
They are State of Utah v. Jose Carlos Pena, 865 P.2d 932, and State of Utah v. Visser, 31
P.3d 584 (Utah App. 2001). However, those two cases merely illustrate an issue that is virtually
hornbook law, i.e. that the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
and that issues of credibility of the witnesses are best left to the trial court. In this case, that is
the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who is the only one who saw and heard the testimony of
the witnesses.
Nevertheless, Appellant apologizes for that omission.
Respondent also argues that because the two cases cited by Appellant are criminal cases,
they are "—irrelevant to an administrative proceeding." Regardless of whether they are criminal
cases, or not, the principal enunciated would appear to be valid.
It is interesting to note that Respondent also quotes criminal cases when it suits him. See
for example, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) to name only a couple of several.
Secondly, Appellant, as Respondent pointed out, misquoted the Labor Commissioner
when Appellant stated that the Commission had mis-identified the name of the automobile
dealership operated by Appellant and his son, as Kelly Gates Enterprises, when in fact it was
Sunland Sales and Leasing.
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On closer examination of the Labor Commissioner's statement, Appellant admits he
misread the statement and Appellant apologizes for that error.
To show however, that errors are easy to make, Respondent miscited at least two of the
cases in his Table of Authorities. Giles v. Industrial Comm'n was cited as "967 P.2d 745, when
it should have been, 692 P.2d 743. And, Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review should have
been page 63, not 68.
Regardless, these are incidental issues, and not germane to the important issues of the
case.
Appellant will attempt to respond to those issues of the case as they were raised by the
Respondent in his Brief.
FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
Respondent raises as his principal issue, it appears, that the Appellant failed to "marshal
the evidence," in his brief. The problem, as the Appellant sees it with that argument is that the
Order of the Labor Commissioner was made up almost entirely of unreferenced conclusions,
even in his Statement of Facts, making it extremely difficult for a third party to know what the
alleged evidence was which he based any particular finding upon.
Examples of such statements are as follows:
"—[T]he Commission finds such testimony (presumably all of the testimony of
the Respondent) to be responsive, simple and straight-forward."
Since almost the entire case supporting the Labor Commissioner's Order is dependant
upon his determination that Respondent, not the other witnesses who testified, was credible, this
becomes very significant.
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How does one "marshal the evidence" for such a broad all-inclusive statement as that? It
is especially difficult when one of the principal issues in this case, revolves around the relative
"credibility of the witnesses" and the ALJ superficially found the Respondent to not be credible.
The Labor Commissioner follows up the above statement in the same paragraph with the
statement that, "Furthermore, Anderson's testimony does not conflict with the testimony of Mr.
Hoskins, the only disinterested individual to testify in this matter."
It is impossible to "marshal the evidence" in support of that conclusion, because as
Appellant demonstrated in his opening brief, that statement was simply not true, and in fact,
Anderson's testimony did conflict with Mr. Hoskins' testimony!
The Commissioner made a further finding that the testimony of Kelly Gates, Sr. and
Kelly Gates, II was equivocal and inconsistent, but does not state the facts he depends upon in
making that broad finding. How does one "marshal the evidence" in support of that conclusion,
when the Appellant does not believe the record reflects that Kelly Gates, Sr. and Kelly Gates, II's
testimony is equivocal and inconsistent. In fact, just the opposite is more likely true.
Perhaps the Commissioner was attempting to support that conclusion with the statement
that "—Senior asked Mr. Hoskins, a construction contractor, to turn in Anderson's injury as a
claim against Hoskins' workers' compensation insurance policy." And that "—[s]uch a claim
would have been fraudulent." Of course, that might have been a fact that could have been
"marshaled", if it were true.
However, one cannot marshal evidence in support of that conclusion because that is
clearly not what happened. It would have been abundantly clear to the Commissioner that that is
not what the testimony was if he had been listening to the actual testimony.
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As pointed out in Appellant's opening brief, Appellant merely asked Hoskins if he had
insurance that would cover the injury, and he was told "no" and that was the end of it. (See
Hoskin's testimony, Tr. p. 103, lines 7-13.)
Appellant did not ask him to submit an insurance claim, when he did not have insurance
that would cover the injury. (See also, page 20 of Appellant's Opening Brief.)
It is of some importance to point out as background that Hoskins had done some work on
the house. (See Tr. p. 103, lines 7-12.) This might have suggested that he may have had
insurance that would cover the injury, explaining why the question was even asked in the first
place. When Gates was told that he, Hoskins, did not have, as Hoskins testified, "that was the
end of it."
In an effort to "marshal the evidence," one cannot concoct evidence when it does not
appear in the record. The fact is that the Appellant, in his Opening Brief, attempted to deal with
each important issue that was raised by the Labor Commissioner, and thereby, in the only form
possible, "marshal the evidence" of the Commissioner's Order in the best way he could, and
showing how, whatever he based his conclusion upon, was in error or clearly misinterpreted or in
many cases totally in contrast with what the testimony or evidence, that was actually presented,
was.
It is true that the Respondent had cited some items that he believes supports his, the
Respondent's position in this case, but there is no way to determine whether any of those
allegations were what the Commissioner might possibly have relied upon in making some of the
broad conclusions that he made. Appellant will deal with those issues later in this brief.
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RESPONDENT ARGUES THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH RULE 24(a)(5)(A)
First, Respondent states that the Appellant was obligated to and did not "preserve the
issues in the trial court."
This appears to be nothing but a red herring.
It is obvious that Appellant's claims on appeal are not legal errors made by the ALJ who
conducted the only hearing or trial that was held. The issues are that the Labor Commissioner
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, abused his discretion and went against the weight of the
evidence in reversing the Findings and Conclusions of the ALJ. There are no legal issue to be
preserved in the trial, or hearing that was held in the matter. The legal issue arose when the
Labor Commission reversed the ALJ. The Appellant had no idea that that would be the subject
of this appeal until after the Labor Commissioner reversed the Findings and the Conclusions of
the ALJ, and after the hearing was held and concluded.
The Labor Commissioner made his Order reversing the Findings of the ALJ without any
hearing whatsoever or notice to the parties whatsoever. How can the Appellant "preserve that
issue in the trial court?"
Second, the Respondent argues, apparently, though it is a little vague, that Appellant listed
his four issues, but then never dealt with them in the brief thereafter.
The issues stated in the Appellant's brief, in capsule form were, did the Labor
Commissioner, in reversing the Findings of the ALJ a) prejudice the Appellant, b) go against the
clear weight of the evidence, c) abuse his discretion, and d) was his Order arbitrary and
capricious?
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It hardly takes reciting Appellant's entire opening brief over again to show that his brief
was entirely devoted to answering those four questions, or issues, in the affirmative.
Third, Respondent asserts that the two cases cited by the Appellant in support of the issue
that the trial court's determination of credibility of the witnesses, State v. Pena, supra, and State
v. Visser, supra, are criminal cases and hence should not be considered. That matter has been
dealt with already and need not be rehashed.
Fourth, Respondent states that Appellant's brief, "should contain the points relied upon ..
. and these points should be supported by authorities." This may well be the case when the
issues are primarily legal issues. But, here, the issues are basically factual. Does the record
show that the Labor Commissioner abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously?
Appellant does not believe he has violated Rule 24 by arguing the facts and showing,
hopefully that the facts do not support the Labor Commissioner's Order. Citing legal authorities
hardly assists the court in determining the facts as they appear in this record. Appellant fails to
understand how he may have violated any of the requirements of Rule 24.
RESPONDENT CLAIMS APPELLANT HAS MISREPRESENTED
EVIDENCE TO THE COURT
Appellant has apologized above. But, to further explain that it was an unintentional error,
Appellant read the phrase in the Commissioner's Order, "—he (the Appellant) had formed
another automobile business, this time with Junior, his son. Under the business name of 'Kelly
Gates Enterprises,' Senior owns rental units . . . ." etc.
Unfortunately, but unintentially, Appellant read the phrase "under the name of 'Kelly
Gates Enterprises . . .'" to be part of the previous sentence, not the subsequent one. The error is
inexcusable, but certainly not an intentional effort to mislead the court.
6

Again, it is important to refer to the point made in State of Utah v. Visser 31 P.3d 584,
587 (Ut. App. 2001) that "to the extent that findings of fact are based on a determination of
credibility, we defer to the trial court."
FAILURE TO SUPPORT STATEMENTS MADE IN
APPELLANT'S BRIEF WITH CITES TO THE RECORD
In his paragraph (a) on page 20 of his brief, Respondent complains that Appellant failed
to cite to the record, when, in the argument portion of his brief, he stated that Appellant had built
condos using a contractor. Perhaps that particular fact was not cited, but it could have been, and
Appellant apologizes for not having done so, but it can be substantiated by a citation of the
record. Page 21 of the record, lines 12-13 states when asked if he (Appellant) built apartments,
the Appellant stated: "I hired a contractor to do it."
In paragraph (b) Respondent argues on page 20 of his brief that Appellant did not cite to
the record concerning the nail gun and compressor. However, see page 23 of Appellant's brief in
which Appellant cited the court to three pages of the transcript, pages 29-31 which discussed the
entire issue of the nail gun and the compressor to operate it.
In paragraph (c), on page 20 of his brief, Respondent represents that the Appellant made
no citation to the record to support that statement that the Commissioner must have relied solely
upon testimony of Anderson in determining that Kelly Gates II, the owner of the house was
never on the job, Respondent cited page 26-27 of Appellant's brief, which has nothing to do with
the issue stated by Respondent.
That fact is, Appellant did cite numerous pages in the transcript and even copied portions
of the record, on pages 13 and 14 of his brief, pointing out that the Commissioner stated that
"Anderson did not see Junior at the building site until the project was well under way."
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Thereafter, Appellant spent a considerable amount of time showing citations to the Record that
Anderson did see, or should have seen Gates II there because he was there.
In his paragraph (d) on page 20 of Respondent's brief, Respondent again complains that
no citations were provided to support the issues in that paragraph.
However, it is obvious that, contrary to Respondent's representation, that paragraph, in
the argument portion of the brief, was simply a summary of issues, that had each been dealt with
earlier in the brief.
For example, with reference to the Appellant's professional background see paragraph 5
and paragraph 16 of Appellant's Statement of Facts as to the issue of Appellant's payment of
wages to Respondent see paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of his Statement of Facts.
Finally, in paragraph (e) on page 21 of Respondent's brief, he again raises the specter of
some terrible sin that Appellant, in the argument portion of his brief did not provide a cite for the
statement that Appellant was merely watching the workers but acted only on the instructions of
his son. However, see paragraph 8 of Appellant's Statement of Facts, and two cites to the record
found on page 16 and 17 of Appellant's brief.
As to the allegation that Appellant did not cite to the record, that is simply not true as
demonstrated above.
DOES THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT THE
LABOR COMMISSIONER'S ORDERS?
In part II of Respondent's Reply Brief, after spending approximately 24 pages of his brief
dealing with issues not germane to the real issue involved in this case, Respondent finally gets to
the heart of the matter. That is, "does the Labor Commissioner's Order substantially prejudice
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the Appellant; was it without substantial evidence to support it; was it an abuse of discretion;
and, was it arbritary and capricious?"
First, Respondent argues that "it is well established that when an employer has retained
the right to control the worker of a worker's compensation claimant, the claimant is the
employer's employee for worker's compensation purposes." The Appellant does not contest that
statement as a general principle of law. What Appellant does contest, and believes the record
shows, is that the Appellant, as a matter of fact did not retain the right to control the claimant.
The Appellant has attempted to show that the Labor Commissioner ignored substantial
evidence to the contrary and misplaced his trust solely in the testimony of the Respondent.
Appellant will not attempt to repeat the testimony and evidence that contradicts that testimony
here, but it is outlined in his opening brief on page 16 and 17.
Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 958 P.2d 240, 244, has a very
good discussion of one of the most important issues of this case. Respondent, in citing the lines
that he recited above, did not quote the following sentence, on page 244, which states as follows:
"Furthermore, 'it is the right of control that is the critical element underlying an employment
relationship,' not the actual exercise of control." (Citing cases.)(Emphasis added.)
The Osman court, likewise, on page 244, discussing Special Division/No Insurance
Section v. Industrial Commission, 172 Ariz. 319, 836 P.2d 1029 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) stated on
page 244, "the court found no evidence 'that London has ever employed anyone, nor was there
evidence that he and Reeder had entered into a 'contract of hire.'" Id. at 1033. The court
rejected the ALJ's determination that London "exercised sufficient right to control" Reeder so as
to be his employer, "stating that 'it is the right to control, not the exercise of that right, that is
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determinative.'" Id. Furthermore, the "exercise of'routine supervision' over an employee is not
in itself sufficient to establish an employment relationship." (Emphasis added.)
While there is, of course, the testimony of the Respondent that he was working for the
Appellant, not Appellant's son, whose house was being built, the overall picture of what was
happening and the testimony of those who really knew, makes it very obvious that the facts were
that a father was simply attempting to help his young son save some money in the construction of
his personal residence. The Appellant was not acting as a contractor on the job.
The Appellant probably was on the site more often than his son was, but anything he did
was pursuant to his son's instructions and only on behalf of his son. Appellant's opening brief
documents that fact. The Osman case, supra, confirms that his presence and even "routine
supervision" does not make him an employer.
Second, Respondent argues that because Appellant hired the Respondent to do some
framing work in the process of converting some storage units into offices, he must have been a
contractor on the construction of Gates II's personal residence.
The record of the testimony is (Tr. page 23, lines 13-20) as follows:
Q. Okay. And on this fthe storage units) project you say he (Respondent) had
worked for you a couple of days? (Emphasis added.)
A. Yes.
Q. What kind of things did you have him do—or did he do?
A. Just framing.
Q. Okay. Just wood framing, wood studs, that type of thing?
A. Yes.
It is easy to conclude that Respondent was not, even on that project, acting as a contractor
but as the owner of a building, converting a storage unit into an office.
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It is a great stretch to assume that that is the basis for finding that he was a contractor on
the construction of his son's home.
Perhaps Appellant should have been more careful, and maybe even, for sake of argument,
he should have behaved as an employer and paid certain taxes etc. for those two days of work, or
on the other hand, maybe he should have made sure he was hiring a "contractor," not a carpenter.
As Appellant testified, "he did some work for a couple of days out there." (Tr. page 22,
lines 24 & 25.) That hardly makes a contractor out of him in the building of Kelly Gates II's
personal residence.
Third, Respondent argues that because he, himself, told the doctor he was working for
Appellant, that that is proof that Appellant was a contractor. Of course, under the circumstances,
that was a self-serving statement, bearing little or no credibility whatsoever, other than that he
was already thinking about the deeper pocket he might be able to tap into. It conflicts with most
of the other evidence in the trial.
Fourth, Respondent bears down heavily on the issue that Appellant advanced funds to
Respondent when he demanded money, on almost a daily basis. Appellant devoted considerable
space and time in his opening brief citing to the record, explaining that that was no more
nefarious than an effort to assist his son. That issue has been dealt with in Appellant's opening
brief. Whose version one believes, depends upon who was best able to assess the credibility of
the witnesses, as well as the whole record. Appellant will further refer to that issue again infra.
Fifth, on page 25 of Respondent's brief, he states, (interestingly, without citation to the
record) that "Gates Sr. initially testified that Anderson wanted to be paid in cash for 'tax
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purposes.' However, when confronted with his own checks drawn on the Kelly Gates
Enterprises' account, Gates Sr. had to admit that Anderson was always paid by check, not cash."
Presumably that reference was intended somehow by the Respondent to show that the
Appellant was not credible because he had "lied" about how Respondent was paid. However,
even a cursory review of the actual testimony shows that that statement was untrue and
misrepresents the testimony that was given. In fact, the testimony, as it appears in the record,
paints an entirely different picture.
By referring to the total series of questions and answers, one can see that Appellant had
been asked why he thought Respondent had "asked" to be paid in cash. (Tr. page 79, lines 1325, and page 80, lines 2-11.)
The salient point in that exchange of questions and answers is as follows:
Mr. Wright: Yeah. I'll withdraw the previous one (question) and ask him if he
(Respondent) ever told why he wanted to be paid in cash?
The Court: Proceed.
The Witness: He never explicitly said, no.
Q. (By Mr. Wright) Okay.
A. I assumed it was for tax purposes. (Emphasis added.)
(Mr. Prisbrey: Objection. Move to strike.)
The Court: So stricken.
Now Respondent is attempting to use that exchange to discredit the Appellant. The fact
is, even if not stricken by the ALJ, the Appellant was merely speculating as to why Respondent
may have "wanted" to be paid in cash. It was not a statement that the Appellant did pay in cash.
In fact, Respondent's own reference to the evidence showed that Respondent was paid by check,
not in cash. There was no reflection on Appellant's credibility in that statement!

12

That misrepresentation of the record not only fails to support Respondent's argument
concerning that issue, it further illustrates the difficulty one would have in attempting to
"marshal the evidence" in support of the Labor Commissioner's Order.
Sixth, Respondent attempts to create an issue out of the fact that when Respondent was
injured and could not get medical treatment because he had no money, out of sympathy for him,
and in an attempt to assist another human being, Appellant and his son obtained $1,000.00 to be
paid to the doctor for his treatment. There was some conflict in who actually delivered the check
to the doctor, the son, or to the Respondent, himself.
The fact that the incident had happened three to four years before the hearing was held,
and the parties could not remember for certain which of the two of them had actually delivered
the check, hardly seems to rise to the level Respondent attributes it to, that is, that it shows
Appellant and his son to be liars.
The fact that the Respondent has to depend upon that kind of "evidence" to discredit the
Appellant and his son, should tell a lot about the strength of his overall case.
Seventh. Another offensive tactic by the Respondent is to repeatedly refer to Gates II as
having "doctored" the evidence. What Respondent is referring to, and the only thing he can be
referring to, is the fact that Kelly Gates II, in order to raise the $1,000.00 to assist the
Respondent, when he needed cash in order to even be able to get in to see a doctor, submitted a
request for a draw on his construction loan, showing labor costs to be higher than the amount
actually paid to workers for actual labor during that period but still under the budgeted sum. (Tr.
page 175, lines 6-10.)

13

The facts are that that extra money could well be legitimately attributed to the cost of
labor, the account from which it was drawn. But more importantly, the money that was drawn
was Kelly Gates IPs own money, money that he would have to and did repay the bank as a
payment on his loan.
This hardly seems so egregious as the Respondent tries to make it out to be. Certainly, it
does not seriously reflect upon the credibility of the Gates' testimony. Rather it reflects upon his
generosity in attempting to assist a man whom had had hired, and who then turned on him.
In all candor, Gates II, after being badgered by Respondent's counsel did, when asked a
couple of times if he was not "doctoring" the paperwork he gave to the bank, when applying for a
draw, said "Yes, you could say that." (Tr. page 175, line 8.) If the Labor Commissioner had
been there to hear the testimony, he would have understood that the statement did not in any way
reflect that Gates II thought he was doing anything wrong or illegal.
Very importantly, however, this incident further discredits the Respondent's argument on
the bigger issue. Respondent argues that Appellant was the contractor on the job and should be
held liable, because it was he who made payments to Respondent out of his own business
account. Yet, here, Respondent argues that Appellant's son is not credible because he obtained
the $1,000.00 to repay his father for the loan the father made to pay the doctor for Respondent's
treatment.
The Respondent can't have it both ways. Either it was the father making the payment or
it was the son. Obviously, it was the son.
Eighth, Respondent argues that because Appellant paid the Respondent out of his own
business account for wages he earned, Appellant must have been a contractor. Appellant does
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not deny that he paid the employees when they were demanding payments on an almost daily
basis, or, at most, approximately every other day, or they would walk of the job, because his son
could not obtain draws from the bank that often.
See Transcript page 169, lines 20-25, and page 170, line 1, which reads as follows:
Q. And Mike would contact you every day or two wanting money, and that's why
you have told your dad to go ahead and pay him?
A. Dad paid him because I couldn't every day or two, and I needed to keep him
on the job working. I needed—and Mike was hitting me up every couple of days
for a paycheck.
And, that testimony was reiterated several times.
However, as documented in Appellant's opening brief, Appellant was repaid when Gates
II was able to obtain a draw, and Appellant received no compensation, even interest on his
money.
The Appellant received no compensation for the services he rendered to his son, services
that only a father would provide, to assist his son in building the son's own residence. (Tr. page
158, lines 12-14, page 52, lines 16-19.)
Finally, Respondent argues, essentially, that because the Labor Commissioner has
reversed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge, that that
is the end of the case. He cites cases in support of the contention that the Labor Commissioner
has the authority to reverse the Administrative Law Judge.
The real issue, however is, the effect of Section 63-46b016(4)(g) and (h)(iv) which
provides that an appellant may have relief on appeal if he has been substantially prejudiced by
the Labor Commissioner in any of the following regards:
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(g) The agency action is based upon determination of fact, made or implied by
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record, before the court (Emphasis added.)
(h) the agency action is:
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

The above statute would have no meaning whatsoever if it did not provide a reviewing
court the opportunity to review all the evidence and make a determination whether the abovecircumstances do exist, i.e. that the Labor Commissioner acted contrary to the weight of the
evidence and acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
A determination of credibility of witnesses is only a partial aspect in deciding whether the
evidence supports the Labor Commissioner's order reversing the ALJ. But it has to be an
important element in light of the pronouncements in many cases, including, State v. Pena, supra,
and State v. Visser, supra, that the judge who hears and sees the evidence should be relied upon
very heavily for a determination of the credibility of the witnesses. This should be especially
true when so much of the case is decided by reliance upon the credibility of the witnesses, as in
this case. And here the ALJ specifically found the Respondent was not credible and took
advantage of the system in the hearing. (See ALJ's Findings, page 4, Addendum A.)
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO EVEN REFER TO OR
DISCUSS APPELLANT'S POINTS SUPPORTING HIS APPEAL
It is interesting that the Respondent, in his Reply Brief, fails to deal directly with the
references to the testimony raised by the Appellant which contradicted the findings of the
Commissioner but, rather quotes snippets of supposed testimony and made his own conclusions
as to the meaning of those references, most of which, as have been pointed out supra are mis-
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statements, misinterpretations of the testimony or are references that did not even exist in the
record, as Respondent stated them.
Appellant will deal with each of them here.
On page 20 of Respondent's Brief, he begins 7 paragraphs that he claims support the
Labor Commissioner's Findings.
In paragraph (a), Appellant is quoted as having said that the payments Appellant made to
Respondent did not including anything due Respondent on either Appellant's Kolob cabin he had
worked or for the conversion of the storage unit to an office.
As reported, Appellant was adamant that it did not. However, when showed that during a
certain period he was paid less from the draw on his son's construction account than what he
actually paid to Respondent, he agreed that he might have made a mistake and paid Respondent
partly for work on the storage units and partly for the work on his son's residence.
Respondent makes that out to be evidence of his lack of credibility. What it actually
shows, however, just the opposite.
As Appellant testified, "I know that everything that I paid him (Respondent) (on his son's
residence) I was reimbursed for. (Tr. p. 146, lines 10 & 11) And again, on Tr. pg. 147, line 23 &
24. "Well, anything that he (Respondent) did on Kelly's house, I was reimbursed for."
If one were there to hear all of the testimony, it was clear, unlike the Respondent's
interpretation of the testimony, it only supports the fact that he did not receive reimbursement for
money he paid on behalf on his son that was not for his son's home.
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Paragraph (b) Respondent revisits that "tax purposes" issue, but it has already been
pointed out that Respondent misrepresented the testimony concerning that issue, supra, and it
needs no further treatment now.
Paragraph (c) Respondent takes issue with the fact that Appellant assumed that a
conversation between Kelly Gates II and Respondent, when he hired him could have been at his
or his son's home, but was probably over the telephone. Respondent's counsel opines that all
three of them could not communicate over the phone. However, it is not difficult at all, during a
discussion of that type to hear one side of the telephonic conversation and understanding
precisely what is going on. The important point, though, is that it was the son on the phone when
he hired the Respondent, not the Appellant. That is hardly a very persuasive issue.
Paragraph (d) raises the issue of why Appellant advanced payments to the workers when
Gates II could not get draws on his construction loan as often as the workers wanted to be paid.
That issue has been dealt with in Appellant's opening brief and elsewhere in this one and does
not need to be reiterated here.
Paragraph (e) Respondent points out that when first questioned about who had signed for
the building permit on the son's home, could not remember for sure, but assumed it had been his
son. Remember, this was three to four years later, during which time no one had anticipated
having to remember every little detail! When showed his signature on the permit, it did refresh
his memory as one of the tasks he had performed for his son who did not have the free time that
he had. Again, it seems like, as the saying goes, Respondent is attempting to make a mountain
out of a molehill.
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Paragraph (f) Respondent raises the issue of who actually delivered the $1,000.00 check
to respondent when he needed money to have his injury treated by the doctor. Again, that has
already been discussed.
The real point is, however, if that is a valid point, it is only fair to point out that the Labor
Commissioner did not even have benefit of having sat through five hours of hearings formed
impressions, and made contemporary notes.
It seems obvious that for the Respondent to depend upon those seven points to justify the
action of the Labor Commissioner, only demonstrates that there was very little to go on, not to
mention how difficult it would have been for the Appellant to "marshal the evidence" in support
of the Labor Commissioner's Order.
On the other hand, the Appellant attempted to show, with reference to the important
issues the abundance of testimony that directly contradicted the Labor Commissioner's overall
conclusions supporting his reversal of the Findings of the ALJ.
Appellant can only refer to his opening brief for a review of the evidence and testimony
which makes the Labor Commissioner's reversal of the Findings of the ALJ, a substantial
prejudice to the Appellant, without substantial evidence to support it, and both arbitrary and
capricious.
EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARINESS AND CAPRICIOUSNESS
OF THE LABOR COMMISSIONER
It is of further significance as to the issue of whether the action of the Labor
Commissioner was arbitrary or capricious or not, it seems to the Appellant, is that the Labor
Commission has communicated to the Court, through its General Counsel, that it "does not
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intend to submit a separate brief in the matter, but generally subscribes to the arguments set forth
in the brief of George Anderson, already on file." See Addendum B attached hereto.
It should be noted, in light of the position, now being taken by the Commission,
regarding the issue of arbitrariness and capriciousness, that the Counsel for the Uninsured
Employers Fund, an agency of the Labor Commission, at the time of the hearing before the ALJ,
when given an opportunity to file a written closing argument, along with other counsel, and who,
at that time, had the option, to go either way, in support of the Respondent, or in support of the
Appellant, and who having heard all of the testimony, and seen the evidence, argued strongly and
persuasively in support of the Appellant, not the Respondent. See attached hereto as Addendum
C to this brief.
Note specifically the final paragraph of that argument which outlines the position of the
Labor Commission (through its agent) at that time:
"In summary, the evidence is that Gates, Jr. hired Anderson. Gates Jr. had
the ultimate right to oversee the work on the home, including making decisions
regarding the appearance and workmanship of the home. Gates Jr. approved
payment of the checks and had the ultimate decision making authority to object or
resolve any disputes regarding authority to object or resolve any dispute regarding
wages or hours. Gates Sr. testified he did not believe he had any authority to take
Petitioner off the job, but a responsibility to tell his son that there were problems.
Gates Sr. stated that he would not have the ability to fire Anderson without his
son's permission. Gates Jr. was the individual with ultimate authority and control
over the employment of Petitioner . . .
Gates Jr. was the property owner, and the holder of the construction loan.
As such, Gates Sr. would have absolutely no legal authority to bind any decision
regarding the property or the building of the home, except that delegated to him
by his son. The fact that Gates Jr. is exempt under the Worker's Compensation
Act pursuant to §34A-2-103 has not bee disputed. Therefore, the claim should
accordingly be dismissed.
That conclusion is well supported in the body of the counsel for the Labor Commission's
argument. And again, in its Reply to Motion for Review, counsel for the UEF expanded the
20

argument in support of the Appellant, pointing out numerous references to the record that
supported that position. (See Addendum D hereto.)
To the Appellant, that alone, even with nothing more, seems to make the Labor
Commissioner's 180 degree reversal of position look very arbitrary and capricious.
Of course, Respondent may, and probably will argue that that was not the Labor
Commissioner himself who authored those statements, and that he should and does have the
authority to reverse those "arguments."
The fact remains, however, that everyone who listened to the testimony and saw the
evidence, who had the option to draw an objective conclusion, even the Labor Commissioner's
own attorney viewed the testimony and evidence favorable to the Appellant. How can it not be
arbitrary and capricious for the Labor Commissioner who did not hear the testimony or observe
the witnesses go against the objective observers, i.e. the ALJ and the attorney for the UEF, one of
which works for the Utah Labor Commission?
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT'S
APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Respondent argues that because the Appellant has chosen to exercise his right to
appeal as provided in §63-46-16(1) of the Utah Code Annotated, he should be assessed penalties
for a frivolous delay of the conclusion of this dispute.
A review of the record in this matter will show that as to the issue of delay, Respondent's
counsel both filed a motion to remove the ALJ from the case, (See Addendum E hereto.) a
complaint against the ALJ with the Utah State Bar seeking to have him disbarred, resulting in a
substantial delay of over several months. (See Addendum E attached hereto.)
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Appellant does not criticize the Respondent for taking whatever steps, within the law, that
he thinks necessary, but Appellant does not believe Respondent should properly allege that the
Appellant, by exercising his right to appeal, should be penalized for exercising that right, as
delaying the matter when Respondent created considerable delay himself, just on the other end of
the case.
CONCLUSION
The Order of the Labor Commissioner reversing the Findings and Conclusions of Law
and Order of the Administrative Law Judge should itself be reversed and the Administrative Law
Judge's Order reinstated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £b

dayjrf June, 2002.
/

J.JvIacArthur Wright
'of and for
r
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WELKER
Attorney for Appellant

22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant
Kelly Gates Sr., was served this^fe day of June, 2002, to Appellee's counsel via U.S. Postage
Services, first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Aaron J. Prisbrey, Esq.
1071 East 100 South
Building D, Suite 3
St. George, UT 84770
Alan Hennebold, Esq.
Utah Labor Commission
160 East 300 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Case No. 97694

GEORGE M. ANDERSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,

&

V,

ORDER

KELLY GATES SR.
aka KELLE;GATES SR. (uninsured)
and the UNINSURED EMPLOYERS
FUND,
Respondents.

HEARING;

July 1, I999at3:00 P.M.
Fifth District Court
Courtroom J
220 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

BEFORE:

Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

APPEARANCES:

George M. Anderson (Anderson, petitioner or applicant) is
represented by attorney Aaron Prisbrey.
The respondent, Kelly Gates Sr. (Gates Sr or respondent) is
represented by attorney J. MacArthur Wright.
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The Uninsured Employer's Fund is represented by attorney
Sherrie Hayashi.
INTRODUCTION OF CASE

Anderson filed a pro se Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission on
August 27. i997 requesting medical expenses, temporary total and permanent partial
disability comoensauon and travel expenses. Anderson alleges that he sustained an
indusiriai acciaeni arising out of and in the course of his employment by Kelly Gates Sr.
on January J 71 I996 That Application was assigned case number 97694, a copy was
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sent to the Respondents, an Answer thereto was timely filed and the matter was
ultimately set for this hearing. Attorney Prisbrey entered the case on behalf of the
petitioner on March 24, 1998.
Seven exhibits were admitted without objection, four by the petitioner and three
by the respondents. Petitioner invoked the exclusionary rule and accordingly the
witnesses were sworn, instructed, and all that were not parties left the room. After
having taken that step, the petitioner then called respondent Kelly Gates Sr. as his first
witness andjsxamined him extensively for over two hours. Petitioner called as his
second witness Seymour Hoskins, and at last petitioner presented his own testimony.
It should be noted that there are two Kelly Gates, father (who is the respondent)
and his son, hereinafter respectively referred to as Gates Sr. and Gates II.
The respondents presented the testimony of Gates Sr. and Gates II.
The issue for resolution is whether Gates was an employer and Anderson an
employee within the pun/iew of the Workers Compensation Act, or whether the work
Anderson was doing was exempted from the Workers Compensation Act pursuant to
U . C A 34A-2-103 (0(b) exempting those constructing their own homr
le.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The-occurrence of Anderson's injury on January 17, I996T the ensuing treatment,
time off work and impairment are not contested. It is stipulated that he was working 26
hours per week at $ i 2 per hour, was married and had one child.
Although Hoskins was listed as the contractor and did put in the footings for the
house, he denied that he was the general contractor and no party has joined him in this
action. Hoski.ns testified that he knew Gates II was building the house and that Gates
Sr. was just helping his son.
As he had been for approximately 6 weeks on January 17, (996 Anderson was
involved in framing a personal residence for Gates II. When Anderson was breaking a
metal band around some lumber, the band struck and lacerated his left wrist.
Anderson was off work from the date of injury to June 1, I996 when he was released to
full duty.
Gates Sr's livelihood was in automobile dealerships from which he is now semiretired, i.e., he stiii has an interest in a St. George dealership. Gates Sr. had hired a
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ccntracior :c build an apartment house for him previously in 1985 He also has some
storage units two of which he was remodeling into office space with Anderson and
other assistams
At Anderson's request, Anderson was paid cash for his work on the
conversion Anderson also did some work for Gates Sr ai a personal cabin in Koiob
canyon Ancerscn made the same request tor payment in cash for the work on the
T
cabin
^ e storage-unit-to-office conversion was going on at the same time as the
construction of Gates il s home, where the alleged industrial accident occurred
Gates
Sr had bu ! t H is own home previously and the same plans were used in the
construction of this home for Gates II
Gates Sr gave Gates II the lot where the accident occurred on the condition
that he would live on it for at least 5 years. Gates Sr advised his son to build his own
heme because of the savings that Gates If couid make. On August 17, I995. Gates ll
and his wi r e tock out a construction loan in their sole names to build the bouse Gates
il was 21 years eld at the time and intended for this house to be his family s own home
Gates ii r>\Tsa Anderson to work for him at Si2 per hour Anderson came to work when
ne wanted
At the time the home was being constructed, Gates II was working full time but
varying smfts at Smith s Dunng the same oeriod, he was also working approximately
30 nours flex time at a car lot as a commission salesman Both jobs were
approximated 10 to 12 minutes from the home site
Petitioner Anderson was newiv married and his wife was pregnant at the time
Anderson ^ a s working on Gates II s home Anderson often asked Gates II for payment
atisr r a v n g ^ o ^ e o just a day or two but Gates II could only submit reimbursement
"equesis f r c ^ the construction loan ^t two week intervals Since Gates II coula not
personally advance the requested amounts to Anderson [it does seem unlikely that at
21 years oid and married, he was working two jobs for any reason other than economic
necessity, and he wanted to keep Anderson on the job, he asked his father to make
the interim QaymdJhts Anderson requested Gates Sr made those payments from his
Business cnecKmg account, Gates Enterprises When Gates II would submit his
re'rrbursement request to the bank and that was received, he would pay his father
back Gates 3r did not receive any consideration for the sums advanced, doing so
onl\ at his sen s request to help him out.
With ^,s sen working long hours on two jobs, semi-retired Gates Sr would also
help his son ov going to the home to monitor Anderson and other workmen's hours, run
errands ror naienais and heip as requested by Anderson Gates Sr also advanced at
his son s reauest oayments to other individuals working on the house, who had the
same frequent neea for money as did Anderson Gates Sr was always reimbursed for
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the exact amounts that he advanced on his son's behalf.
After Anderson was injured, and since he had no personal health insurance, he
went to Gates M and asked for some help so he could get the medical attention that he
needed. In anticipation that Anderson would soon return and be able to work off any
advance, Gates 11 recalls that he loaned Anderson $2T500; $1,000 by his persona!
check dated January 3 1 , (996, another $1 t 000.00 check and S500.00 in cash. Gates II
thinks he got some of the money from the bank under a construction loan advance,
while Gates;Sr. thinks he advanced $1,000.00 of that for his son.
Anderson attempts to interject the tests to determine whether a person is an
independent contractor or an employee in ascertaining whether this is a covered
accident. That is not an appropriate test when the question is whether the exemption
for a persona! residence applies. In this case, Gates Sr. was just the interim financing
until his son was able to get draws from the bank and then Gates Sr. was promptly
reimbursed. There has been no showing that this residence was intended for anything
other than Gates ii's personal residence. Gates Sr. did not own the lot he was not
building this home, he did not take out the loan for the financing on it, and he received
nothing but a return of the amounts he advanced on his son's behalf. In the financial
respect as weii as in having the time flexibility in his semi-retired situation to go to the
home site and keep track of the hours worked by various individuals, Gates Sr. was a
simply a father helping his son, or at worst, a beneficent agent for his son.
There is a question of credibility in this case, that is raised by the vastly different
representations between Anderson's testimony and all of the other witnesses.
However, where petitioner so ordered the testimony of Gates Sr. before his own, the
opportunity for adaptive testimony was in Anderson's hands and he fully utilized it. His
testimony is starkly contrary in nearly every respect with all of the other witnesses,
Gates Sr., Gates H (who had been excluded under the petitioner's invocation of the
exclusionary rule}^ and his own witness, Seymour Hoskins. Having had an opportunity
to observe the testimony, candor and demeanor of the witnesses over the course of this
live-no ur hea rina, and considering the powerful economic incentive to Anderson in
gaining $4200-* in temporary total disability compensation and $6,300+ in permanent
partial disability compensation as well as avoiding the substantial medical expenses
incurred, the ALJ finds that Anderson lacks credibility.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Although no claim was brought against him, a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that Kelly Gates II was engaged in the construction of his personal
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residerce arc was therefore not an employer pursuant to U.C.A. 34A-2-103 (6) (b).
Petitioner George Anderson has faiied to show by a preponderance of the
£v\cer\cs thai Kelly Gates Sr, was his employer on January 17,19S6 while Anderson was
working on Gates ITs home, therefore all of the petitioners claims against Kelly Gates
Sr and the Uninsured Employers Fund should be dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of the petitioner George M. Anderson's
claims under the Application for Heanng filed August 27,1997 against Kelly Gates Sr.
(aka Kerfe Gates Sr.) are hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A parry aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30
days from zhe date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their
Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for
Review
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for
Review or its Response, if none of the parties specifically requests review by the
Appeals Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.

DATED THIS 19th dav of January, 2001
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Donald L. George
Administrative Law Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

i certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
& Order in the matter of George M. Anderson was mailed, first class, postage prepaid
This 19th day of January, 2001, to the following:
GEORGE M. ANDERSON
195 W MAIN STREET
ROCKVILLE. UTAH 84763
KELLE GATES
2306 VINEYARD QRJVE
SANTA CLARA, UTAH 84765
AARON PRISBREY, ATTY
135N900ESTE4
ST GEORGE, UTAH 84770
SHERRIE HAYASHI, ATTY
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
150 E 3 0 0 S, 3W FLOOR
P O B O X 146612
SM.T LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6612
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
160 E 300 S. 3" JFLOOR
P 0 3OX "4661.2
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6612

Alicia Zavaia-Lopez
Support Specialist 111
Utah Labor Commission

/

ADDENDUM B

25

M 0

J30R COMMISSION
Michael (3. Leavitt

160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
PO Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
(801)530-6880
(800) 530-5090
(801) 530-6390 (FAX)
(801) 530-7685 (TDD")

R. Lee Ellertson
r

Governor

> "-nm^ioner

June J. fc'.-(

CLERK OF THE COURT
UTAH COURT OI APPEALS
POBOX 140230
SAI T LAKE CTT^ 1 84114-0230
RE:

Lc;i:

Kelly Gates, Sr. v. Utah Labor Commission and George M. Anderson
CaseNo.20010934-CA

!-..u. oi ti^

The Utah Labor Commission does not intend to submit a separate brief in this matter, but
generally subscribes to the arguments set forth in the brief of George Anderson, already on file.
The Labor Commission does intend to participate in the oral argument on this matter.

Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Utah Labor Commission

cc: J. Mac Arthur "W right
Aaron J. Prisbrey
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GEORGE M. ANDERSON,
Petitioner
vs.
KELLY GATES, SR., aka
KELLE GATES,SR. (uninsured), and
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,
Respondents

CLOSING ARGUMENTS
OF RESPONDENT, THE
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS
FUND

Case No. 97694
Judge: Donald L. George
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COMES NOW the Uninsured Employers' Fund and submits closing arguments in the
above-captioned matter.
The petitioner is correct in asserting that all issues in this case are either stipulated or
uncontested except whether Kelly Gates Sr., or Kelly Gates Jr. was the employer of the
Applicant. Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the preponderance of the evidence clearly
establishes that Kelly Gates Jr. was the employer of Anderson. Further, that Kelly Gates Jr., is
clearly exempt from the Workers Compensation Act pursuant to U.C.A. §34A-2-103(6)(b).

1

I. THE PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE NOT COMPENSABLE UNDER THE
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT.
The Uninsured Employers' Fund does not contest that:
1.

Anderson was involved in an accident on January 17, 1996, wherein he severed
the tendons to his thumb while cutting the band of plywood. The incident
occurred at 7850 North Amethyst Drive in Diamond Valley, Utah.

2.

At the time of injury, Anderson was working 26 hours per week at $12.00 per
hour for a total of $312 per week. He also had one dependent child and a spouse.

However, Petitioner's claims are not compensable under the Workers Compensation Act.
The evidence clearly establishes that Kelly Gates Sr. is not the employer in this circumstance, but
rather that Mr. Anderson was employed by Kelly Gates Jr. Kelly Gates Jr. was engaged in
constructing a personal residence that he himself owned and therefore Kelly Gates Jr. is exempt
under §34A-2-103(6)(b). Therefore, the Uninsured Employers Fund disputes any liability for
compensation under the Workers Compensation Act for the injury to Petitioner. The Uninsured
Employers Fund affirmatively disputes that the Petitioner is entitled to any amounts related to the
accident under the Workers Compensation Act, related to average weekly wage, temporary total
disability, permanent partial disability, and medical expenses.

II.

KELLY GATES JR. IS THE INDIVIDUAL WITH THE ULTIMATE LEGAL

RIGHT AND AUTHORITY OF DIRECTION AND CONTROL OVER EMPLOYMENT
OF THE PETITIONER NOT KELLY GATES SR.

2

This is a case of a 21 year old son asking for his father's experience and assistance in the
building of the son's first

OWTI personal

home. The evidence clearly establishes that Kelly Gates

Jr. was the individual who retained the ultimate legal right and authority of direction and control
over the Petitioner.
In this particular case, it is clear that the only authority Kelly Gates Sr. had was that
authority delegated by his son, Kelly Gates Jr. In this case, the home was being built by and for
Kelly Gates Jr. as his personal residence. Kelly Gates Jr. and his wife were the legal owners of
the property. The construction loan was taken out under the names of Kelly Gates Jr. and his
wife. The father, Kelly Gates Sr. had absolutely no legal right to bind anything on the property
or related to the construction loan. That is, except for that authority delegated to him by his son.
Petitioner argues that Gates Sr is the employer simply because Gates Sr. exercised some
authority and control in this matter. This argument clearly and simply ignores the testimony that
in each and every instance, that Gates Sr. and Gates Jr. testified that each decision was made with
the approval or ratification of Gates Jr. To analogize Petitioner's argument, if that were the
case, every manager, supervisor, or even payroll clerk of an employer would be held
responsible for workers compensation claims. The person who retains ultimate control is the
employer whether that control is exercised or not. In this case, that person is Kelly Gates Jr.
Petitioner cites several examples of where Gates Sr. asserted some type of authority. The
issue however, isn't whether he actually exerted the authority, but that such authority was
delegated to him by his son, who maintained ultimate control.
Gates Jr. testified that at the time the home was being built, he was working three jobs
and could not be at the job site to supervise the work, nor had he any experience in construction
3

work. The son simply asked for his father's assistance. However, Gates Jr. retained the ultimate
authority and control over the work that was done on the property, whether he exercised it or not.
Gates Jr. testified he had concerns regarding the hiring of Anderson. He and his father
spoke about these concerns and Gates Jr. testified that he ultimately decided that he, Gates Jr.,
would go ahead and hire Anderson. Gates Jr. further testified that had his father wanted to hire
Anderson, and that had he been opposed to that, Anderson would not have been hired. It is Gates
Jr. that had the ultimate right of control, to hire, in this particular case.
In another situation, Petitioner contends that Gates Sr. exercised control by sending
Anderson home when he believed that Anderson had shown up for the job under the influence.
Petitioner fails to address the uncontroverted testimony which clearly established that Gates Sr.
had called his son to tell him that Anderson was not in a position to work. Had Gates Sr. had
ultimate authority, he would not have called his son. Gates Sr. further testified that although he
did not feel that Petitioner was in an appropriate condition to work, that he had no right to make
that ultimate decision. Both Gates Sr. and Gates Jr. testified that Gates Jr. was the one who told
Gates Sr. to send Petitioner home.
Petitioner relies on the fact that his checks were made out by Gates Sr., that some of the
equipment used was owned by Gates Sr., and the fact that Gates Enterprises was listed on the
first report of injury somehow constitute an employer-employee relationship. Simply because a
person believes an entity to be the employer does not make it so. The testimony at the hearing
clearly establishes that all checks were paid with the approval of the Gates Jr. Gates Jr. further
testified that had there been a dispute regarding wages, that he would have been the ultimate
decision-maker. Petitioner farther claims that there was commingling of the money paid for
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work done at the business building and for the residential home being built. Whether or not the
funds were commingled, the testimony of both Gates Sr and Jr. reflect clearly that Gates Jr
maintained control over the sums paid to Petitioner and the work performed on Gates Jf s home.
Regarding the providing of the tools, lending tools within the family so that his son could
build his home should not be construed as constituting an employer-employee relationship.
Whether or not Petitioner believed Gates Sr. to be the employer is irrelevant. In this case,
the home was being built by Kelly Gates Jr. He owned the land, he took out a mortgage for the
building of the home. Whether or not Anderson or other people such as Mr. Seymour Hoskins
believed the home was being built by Kelly Gates Sr. is irrelevant. The land is and was clearly in
Gates Jr.'s name. The construction loan was taken out in Gates Jr.'s name.
Although there was some discrepancy in the testimony regarding any amounts paid to
Anderson regarding his injury, and whether those amounts were reimbursed or paid for by Gates
Sr. or Gates Jr, the testimony was clear that in either event, that Gates Jr was the individual
authorizing the payment of $1000.00 to Anderson.
This is not a case where Gates Sr. was working as a contractor and should be held as the
employer in this matter. He has been set out to be a professional contractor which is not true.
He is not a contractor and certainly not in the "business" of being a contractor although he has
done work in the past but primarily for his own personal use and one business building that he
purchased. Gates Sr. testified that he received absolutely no compensation for his work on
Gates Jr/s personal residence, and that he did this work to help out his son, and that he was
simply helping him because he was his son. Gates Sr. and Jr. both testified that since Gates Sr. is
retired, he had the time to oversee the building of the home. The factors identified by Petitioner
5

must be considered as a whole, within the context of the other factors which clearly indicate that
Gates Jr. retained ultimate authority over the employment relationship. Petitioner cannot create a
facade to get around the fact that Kelly Gates Jr. is the employer, by simply calling his father,
Gates Sr., the employer.
In summary, the evidence is that Gates Jr. hired Anderson. Gates Jr. had the ultimate
right to oversee the work on the home, including making decisions regarding the appearance and
workmanship of the home. Gates Jr. approved payment on the checks and had the ultimate
decision-making authority to object or resolve any disputes regarding wages or hours. Gates Sr.
testified he did not believe he had any authority to take Petitioner off the job, but a responsibility
to tell his son that there were problems. Gates Sr. stated that he would not have the ability to
fire Anderson without his son's permission.

Gates Jr.*was the individual with ultimate authorit)

and control over the employment of Petitioner and Gates Jr.
Gates Jr. was the property owner, and the holder of the construction loan. As such,
Gates Sr. would have absolutely no legal authority to bind any decision regarding the property
or the building of the home, except that delegated to him by his son. Gates Jr. is exempt under
the Worker's Compensation Act pursuant to Section 34A-2-103. Therefore, this claim should
accordingly be dismissed.
III. THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING OF INSOLVENCY ON BEHALF OF THE
ALLEGED UNINSURED EMPLOYER, KELLY GATES SR.
In the event that Kelly Gates Sr is found to be liable for worker's compensation in this
matter, there has been no showing of insolvency on behalf of Kelly Gates Sr. Accordingly, the
Uninsured Employers Fund should be dismissed.
6

Respectfully submitted this f(^ day of August, 1999.

&

HAYA<
jE^VtL $$.. HAYASHI
Attorneyvror Uninsured Employers' Fund
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the j(J day of August, 1999,1 served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Closing Arguments by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid addressed
to:
J. MACARTHUR WRIGHT
59 SOUTH 100 EAST
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770
AARON PRISBREY
1071 EAST 100 SOUTH, BLDG D. SUITE 3
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770
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SHERYL M. HAYASHI (6397)
ATTORNEY FOR THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS1 FUND
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, THIRD FLOOR
PO BOX 146600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
PHONE (801) 530-6818

THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH

GEORGE M. ANDERSON,
APPLICANT,
UEF REPLY TO
MOTION FOR REVIEW

V.
KELLY GATES SR
(UNINSURED), and/or UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS FUND,

Case No. 97694

RESPONDENTS

The Uninsured Employer's Fund ("UEF"), by and through its counsel of record, Sheryl
M. Hayashi, hereby submits this Reply to Petitioner's Motion for Review. The UEF asserts that
the decision of the ALJ was correct, and the Motion for Review should be denied.
FACTS
1. A hearing was held on this matter on July 1, 1999 in St. George, Hon. Donald L.
George, presiding.
2.

UEF asserted that Gates Sr. was not the employer, but rather Gates Jr. was the

"employer", and exempt under §34A-2-103(6)(b).
3.

Petitioner in his Motion for Review cites several examples in which the ALJ failed to

reference facts proved at the time of trial. However, Petitioner fails to note that the ALJ,

specifically stated:
There is a question of credibility in this case, that is raised by the vastly different
representations between Anderson's testimony and all of the other witnesses.
However, where petitioner so ordered the testimony of Gates Sr. before his own,
the opportunity for adaptive testimony was in Anderson's hands and he fully
utilized it. His testimony is starkly contrary in nearly every respect with all of the
other witnesses. Gates Sr., Gates II (who had been excluded under the petitioner's
invocation of the exclusionary rule), and his own witness, Seymour Hoskins.
Having had an opportunity to observe the testimony, candor, and demeanor of the
witnesses over the course of this five hour hearing, and considering the powerful
economic incentive to Anderson in gaining $4200-r in temporary total disability
compensation and $5800+ in permanent partial disability compensation as well as
avoiding the substantial medical expenses, incurred, the ALJ finds that Anderson
lacks credibility.
Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the ALJ took into consideration the Petitioner's
testimony, however in light of all of the evidence, did not find the Petitioner's testimony
credible. Rather when looking at the evidence, the testimony of Gates Sr. and Gates Jr., largely
supported each other, even though Gates Jr. had been excluded from the proceedings under the
Petitioner's invocation of the exclusionary rule. When all the evidence and testimony is seen as
a whole, the evidence establishes that Gates Sr was merely assisting his son in the building of the
son's home and that Gates Sr. is not the employer, specifically:
A. At the time of the building of the home, Gates Jr. was approximately 21 years old,
married with a pregnant wife and maintaining two full time jobs. [ p. 73, 149, 155]
B. Gates Jr. testified he was building his own home and that his father, Gates Sr. assisted
him in the building because of the family relationship, [p. 151]
C. Gates Sr. testified his only involvement in the construction of Gates Jr.'s home was to
merely help out his 21 year old son. [p. 74-75] Gates Sr. testified that he was on the job to help
his son since he was semi-retired, [p. 76]
D. Gates Sr. testified that he never received any funds to do any of the work on the

house, [p. 77] Similarly, Gates Jr. also testified that he never paid his father anything for the
work on the house, [p. 158]
E. Gates Sr. testified that he is not a contractor, [p. 78]
F. Gates Sr. testified that Gates Jr. hired the Petitioner to work on the personal residence
of Gates Jr. located in Diamond Valley [ p. 38, 42-45]. Similarly, Gates Jr. testified he was the
individual who hired the Petitioner to work on the building of his own personal residence, [p.
153-155].
G.

Gates Jr. testified he was the individual with authority to hire and fire Petitioner,

[p. 179] Further, Gates Jr. testified that his father had no authority to fire the Petitioner or any of
the other individuals working on the project, [p. 180] Similarly, Gates Sr. testified he could not
have hired these individuals over the objection of Gates Jr. [p. 92-93]
H. Gates Sr. testified that Petitioner negotiated with Gates Jr. regarding Petitioner's rate
of pay. [p. 141] Similarly, Gates Jr. testified that he negotiated the rate of pay with the
Petitioner . [p. 153-154]
I. Petitioner asserts Gates Jr. could not recall the amount that was being paid to the
Petitioner and that the parties had in fact stipulated that the hourly rate was $12.00 per hour.
However, Gates Jr. clearly admitted during the hearing that due to the period of time that had
lapsed, he could not recall the exact figure that he was paying Petitioner, [p. 154] Gates Jr.
merely testified as to what he thought Petitioner was receiving, but specifically stated that he
could not recall the exact figure. Further, as Gates Jr. was excluded from the courtroom due to
Petitioner's invoking of the exclusionary rule, Petitioner's argument that the fact that the parties
had stipulated to the rate of pay as $12.00 per hour is clearly not relevant.
J. Further, even the Petitioner could not recall the amount that he was to be paid per

hour, believing it either to be S12 00 or $1? 50 an hour [p 113]
K Gates Sr testified that all amounts paid to Petitioner from the checks drawn on the
Gates Enterprises account were fully reimbursed by Gates Jr [p 83]
L

Gates Sr further testified that the only reason that the amounts were paid on the

Gates Enterprises account was due to the fact that Gates Jr was unable to get a draw from the
construction loan at the intervals requested by the Petitioner [ p 46-47, 56, 61] Similarly, Gates
Jr testified that the applicant wanted to be paid more fiequently than the draws, specifically that
it seemed like "every two or three days

"[157] Of interest, Gates Jr further testified that the

Petitioner contacted him directly regarding payment

[ p 157] This testimony seems to presume

that the Petitioner knew Gates Jr was the party responsible for payment Gates Jr further
testified that he didn't have the funds to cover the requests between draw and so he requested that
his father pay the amounts, and that he fully reimbursed Gates Sr for those amounts paid to the
Petitioner [p 158]
M Gates Sr testified that all amounts paid to Petitioner were preauthonzed by Gates Jr
[p 97] Similarly, Gates Jr , also testified that he approved all of the payments [p 163]
N Gates Jr was the individual with authority to resolve disputes regarding hours or
payment of wages [p 95]
0 Gates Sr testified that the first time Gates Jr and Petitioner met was while Petitioner
was doing work at the Kolob cabin [p 139] Gates Jr similarly testified that the first time that he
met Petitioner was at the Kolob cabin [p 151] Gates Jr testified that when he initially met
Petitioner, it was a couple of months before the building of the home [p 152] This testimony is
starkly in contrast with the testimony given by Petitioner Petitioner testified that he had never
meet Gates Jr until after he had started working on Gates Jr 's home [ p 117, 128, 136]

P. Even though Gates Jr. was working two jobs, he testified he was intimately involved
in the building of his home. It was his personal residence and he testified that he had some
flexibility from his jobs which would allow him to oversee some of the work that was being
done. [p. 165-167]
Q. Gates Jr. testified he had never built a home before, but stated in his testimony that he
wanted to oversee the building of the home, as he believed anybody would. He stated he would
give direction, "if he wanted windows here, or if he wanted a cathedral ceiling, or walk-in
closets." [p. 169] The testimony was clear that he was not giving direction as to how the work was
to be accomplished, but rather direction on what he wanted done as he was building his personal
residence. Simply because he does not have knowledge of the trade does not mean that he could
not give direction as to his wishes on the building of the home. Although the Petitioner finds this
incredulous, it is hardly that.
R. Gates Sr. testified he was retired and testified he would have run errands for his son,
and further believed that he would have likely have also obtained the building permit for his son.
[ p.76, 85] Similarly, Gates Jr. stated he was working two full time jobs and he testified that his
father assisted him in running errands such as obtaining the building permit.
S. Petitioner contends that there was a scheme devised as to the issuance of the $1000.00
check in order to support the theory that Gates Jr. was the employer and exempt under the
homeowners provision. Although there was a conflict in the testimony as to who the check was
issued from and the delivery of the check or checks, in reading Gates Jr.'s testimony, the testimony
was clear that Gates Jr. gave the approval for issuance of the check, [p. 173] Gates Sr. testified
that Gates Jr. made the decision to pay Petitioner the $1000.00. [p. 96] Gates Jr. stated, on his
own, that he wrote the check. But notably, on his own, he made mention, "I don't think that dad

loaned me the money." [p. 178] There is no evidence to support Petitioner's theory, and is merely
conjuecture.
T. Gates Sr. testified that on one occasion when Petitioner appeared high, in order to take
Petitioner off the job, he called his son before actually taking him of the job. [p. 65-66, 68-69, 93]
Gates Jr. corroborated the incident. Gates Jr. had been excluded from testimony yet he related this
same specific incident, [p. 182] There is nothing to suggest in the record that there could be any
collusion between the two on this testimony. Rather this was a specific incident that each were
asked about, which came up spontaneously. In contrast, Petitioner could not recall this incident.
[p.126]
U. Even if Gates Jr. was not able to be on the site where his residence was being built, he
was still the individual with the ultimate control and authority to make decisions regarding the
property and the building of the home. Gates Sr. testified that he "called his son on every decision
that was made up there stating, "It's his home, if he wanted it fine, if he didn't want it that was fine
too." [p. 94]
V. Gates Sr. only had that authority delegated to him by his son. [p. 98]
W. Petitioner incorrectly asserts that Seymour Hoskins testified that he thought Petitioner
was working for Gates Jr. Mr. Hoskins testified, under oath, that, "I thought Kelly, Jr. was
building his own house and his dad was just helping him. That was my understanding. I have
never had any conversation about the particulars on it or anything." [p. 104]. On cross
examination, Mr. Hoskins reiterated that he knew "it was Kelly Jr.'s residence that was being
built." [p. 106] Further, on cross examination, Mr. Hoskins testified that it was his understanding
that it was nothing more than just a father helping his son. [ p. 106]

ARGUMENT
This is a case of a 21 year old son simply asking for his father's experience and assistance
in the building of the son's own first personal home for his family. Although Gates Sr. oversaw
many of the details on the building of the home, his mere exercise of supervisory direction is not
sufficient to reach the conclusion that he is the employer. The evidence clearly establishes that the
son, Kelly Gates Jr. was the individual who retained the ultimate legal right and authority of
direction and control over the Petitioner. In this particular case, clearly, the only authority Kelly
Gates Sr. had was that authority delegated by his son, Kelly Gates Jr. It is not disputed that Gates
Jr. is exempt pursuant to U.C.A. §34A-2-103(6)(b)
Petitioner argues that Gates Sr. is the employer simply because Gates Sr. exercised some
authority and control in this matter. Essentially, Petitioner is making the argument that Gates Sr
is an independent contractor and that Petitioner is the employee of Gates Sr. However, to
analogize Petitioner's argument, every manager, supervisor, or even payroll clerk of an employer
would be held responsible for workers compensation claims.
It is helpful to look at some of the cases that enunciate the distinction between an employee
and an independent contractor. In Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 958 P.2d
240 (1998), the Court of Appeals approvingly stated: "An independent contractor can employ
others to do the work and accomplish the contemplated result without the consent of the
contractee, while an employee cannot substitute another in his place without the consent of the
employer." In this case, Gates Sr could not have hired, fired, or otherwise substituted employees
without the consent of his son, Gates Jr. The court in Osman went on to state, "exercise of routine
supervision over an employee is not in itself sufficient to establish an employment relationship."
/^.(citing, Special Fund Division/No Insurance Section v. Industrial Commission. 172 Ariz. 319,

836 P.2d 1029 (Ariz Ct. App 1992)). Although Gates Sr. was not an employee of Gates Jr.. his
position is most analogous to that of a supervising employee or agent, of Gates Jr. Gates Sr. is
certainly not an independent contractor, and has no separate employer-employee relationship with
the Petitioner.
The person who retains ultimate control is the employer whether that control is exercised
or not. In this case, that person is Kelly Gates Jr. Kelly Gates Jr. and his wife were the legal
owners of the property. The construction loan was taken out under the names of Kelly Gates Jr.
and his wife, Hayley. The father, Kelly Gates Sr. had absolutely no legal right to bind anything on
the property or related to the construction loan. That is, except for that authority delegated to him
by his son.
The testimony of both Gates Sr. and Gates Jr. was that Gates Jr. was the individual who
hired Petitioner, set his salary, and had the ultimate authority to hire and fire the Petitioner. Gates
Sr. could not have separately hired or fired individuals without the approval of Gates Jr. Gates Jr.
testified he had concerns regarding the hiring of Anderson. He and his father spoke about these
concerns and Gates Jr. testified that he ultimately decided that he, Gates Jr., would go ahead and
hire Anderson. Gates Jr. further testified that had his father wanted to hire Anderson, and that had
he been opposed, Anderson would not have been hired. It is Gates Jr. that had the ultimate right of
control, to hire, in this particular case.
In another situation, Petitioner contends that Gates Sr. exercised control by sending
Anderson home when he believed that Anderson had shown up for the job under the influence.
Petitioner fails to address the uncontroverted testimony which clearly established that Gates Sr.
had called his son to tell him that Anderson was not in a position to work. Had Gates Sr. had
ultimate authority, he would not have called his son. Gates Sr. further testified that although he did

not feel that Petitioner was in an appropriate condition to work, that he had no right to make that
ultimate decision. Both Gates Sr. and Gates Jr. testified that Gates Jr. was the one who told Gates
Sr. to send Petitioner home. Gates Sr. had no independent right to fire the Petitioner, or even to
send him home for the day.
Petitioner relies on the fact that his checks were made out by Gates Sr., that some of the
equipment used was owned by Gates Sr., and the fact that Gates Enterprises was listed on the first
report of injury as somehow constituting an employer-employee relationship. Whether or not
Petitioner believed Gates Sr. to be the employer is not relevant. In this case, the home was being
built by Kelly Gates Jr. Further, Petitioner's argument clearly and simply ignores the testimony
that in each and every instance, that both Gates Sr. and Gates Jr. testified that each decision was
made with the approval or ratification of Gates Jr.
Gates Jr. testified that at the time the home was being built, he was working two full time
jobs and could not be at the job site to supervise the work, nor had he any experience in
construction work. The son simply asked for his father's assistance in maintaining regular
supervision over the project when he was unable to be there.
Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, Seymour Hoskins testified that he thought the home was
being built as Gates Jr.'s personal residence, and that Gates Sr.'s involvement was only that of a
father assisting his son. Hoskins did not testify under oath that he believed that this was Gates Sr's
project, as stated by the Petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there is a scheme devised by the employer regarding delivery of the
check of $1000.00. Petitioner contends that the parties needed to establish that Gates Jr. was the
issuer of the check to support the theory that Gates Jr. was the homebuilder and exempt from
having workers compensation insurance. However, both Gates Sr. and Jr. testified that Gates Jr.

authorized the payment of all monies paid to Petitioner, including the $1000.00 check drawn on
Gates Jr/s account.
Petitioner further claims that there was commingling of the money paid for work done at
the business building and for the residential home being built. Whether or not the funds were
commingled, the testimony of both Gates Sr. and Jr. reflect clearly that Gates Jr. maintained
control over the sums paid to Petitioner and the work performed on Gates Jr's home regardless
from the actual mechanism by which Petitioner was paid. Although there is the one discrepancy
pointed out by the Petitioner regarding the total sums paid to the Petitioner, it is also clear that for
the most part, the sums paid by Gates Sr. were supported by the draws from the bank. All sums
were clearly authorized by Gates Jr. and paid back to Gates Sr. Gates Jr. further testified that had
there been a dispute regarding wages, that he would have been the ultimate decision-maker.
This is not a case where Gates Sr. was working as a contractor and should be held as the
employer in this matter. Gates Sr. testified that he received absolutely no compensation for his
work on Gates Jr/s personal residence, thai he did this work to help out his son, and that he was
simply helping him because he was his son. Gates Sr. has been set out to be a professional
contractor which is not true. Gates Sr. testified that he is not a contractor and certainly not in the
"business" of being a contractor although he has done work in the past but primarily for his own
personal use and the one business building that he purchased. Gates Sr. and Jr. both testified that
since Gates Sr. is retired, he had the time to oversee the building of the home.
The factors identified by Petitioner must be considered as a whole, within the context of the
other factors which clearly indicate that Gates Jr. retained ultimate authority over the employment
relationship. See. Osman, Graham v. R. Thome Found (No one factor is completely controlling;
instead, they should all be considered.") The evidence does not support that Gates Sr. is the

employer. Petitioner cannot create a facade to get around the fact that Kelly Gates Jr. is the
employer, by simply calling his father, Gates Sr., the employer.
SUMMARY
In summary, although some of the evidence was contradictory, the evidence when taken as
a whole, clearly shows that Gates Jr. hired Anderson. Gates Jr. had the ultimate right to oversee
the work on the home, including making decisions regarding the appearance and workmanship of
the home. Gates Jr. approved payment on the checks and had the ultimate decision-making
authority to object or resolve any disputes regarding wages or hours. Gates Sr. testified he did not
believe he had any authority to take Petitioner off the job, but a responsibility to tell his son that
there were problems. Gates Sr. stated that he would not have the ability to fire Anderson without
his son's permission.

Gates Jr. was the individual with ultimate authority and control over the

employment of Petitioner and Gates Jr.
Gates Jr. was the property owner, and the holder of the construction loan. As such. Gates
Sr. would have absolutely no legal authority to bind any decision regarding the property or the
building of the home, except that delegated to him by his son. The fact that Gates Jr. is exempt
under the Worker's Compensation Act pursuant to Section 34A-2-103 has not been disputed.
Therefore, this claim should accordingly be dismissed.
Dated this

2 }

^

of March. 2001

THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND

SHERRIE HAYASHI

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the ,-/'/
of March, 2001,1 served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing UEF REPLY TO MOTION FOR REVIEW by depositing the same in the United States
mail, postage prepaid addressed to:
Aaron Prisbrey
1071 East 100 South, Bldg D Suite 3
St. George, UT 84770
J. MacArthur Wright
Gallian, Westfall, Wilcox & Wright
59 South 100 East
St. George, UT 84770

y&MA- (-£(?srU&r

ADDENDUM E

28

Aaron J. Prisbrey #6968
Attorney for Petitioner
135 North 900 East Suite #4
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone 435/673-1661

THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH

GEORGE M. ANDERSON
Petitioner,
MOTION TO CONTINUE
vs.
Case No. 97694
KELLY GATES, SR. aka KELLE GATES,
SR., and UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'
FUND
Respondents.

Judge Donald L. George

COMES NOW Petitioner, by and through counsel, Aaron J. Prisbrey, and hereby requests this
matter currently set for March 31, 1998, at 8:30 a.m. be continued. This request is made for the
reason counsel for Petitioner, Aaron J. Prisbrey, is party to Complaint filed with the Utah State Bar
alleging Donald L. George is incompetent to function as an attorney or an Administrative Law
Judge. (A Copy of said complaint is attached as Exhibit "A" of the Application to Recuse Judge
filed herewith). Furthermore, Counsel for the Uninsured Employer's Fund, upon receiving
information that the above referenced complaint had been filed, stipulated to a continuance of this
matter. (See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference).
Dated this 30th day of March, 1998.

m J. Prisbrey 1
Attorney for Petitioner/
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to
Continue was delivered as follows:

Hon. Donald L. George
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615

Hand Delivered (one original and one copy)
March 31. 1998

Sharon J. Eblen
Uninsured Employers' Fund
PO Box 146612
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6612
Via facsimile @ 801-530-6804 (one copy)
March 30,1998
J. MacArthur Wright
59 South 100 East
St. George UT 84770

Hand Delivered (one copy)
March 31, 1998

Aaron J. Prisbrey #6968
Attorney for Petitioner
135 North 900 East, Suite 4
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone 801/673-1661

THE LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE NO 97694

GEORGE M. ANDERSON
Petitioner,
APPLICATION TO RECUSE JUDGE

vs.

KELLY GATES, SR. aka KELLE GATES,
SR., and UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'
FUND
Respondents.

Petitioner, by and through counsel, Aaron J. Prisbrey, hereby moves the Court for its
order recusing itself from the above referenced case and requests that he call in another judge to
hear this matter, as Aaron J. Prisbrey is party to Complaint filed with the Utah State Bar alleging
Donald L. George is incompetent to function as an attorney or an Administrative Law Judge. (A
copy of said Complaint with supporting affidavits is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and
incorporated herein by this reference.
DATED this 30th day of March, 1998.

ON J. PRISBREY/
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Application
to Recuse Judge was delivered as follows:
Hon. Donald L. George
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6615
Hand Delivered (one original and one copy)
March 31, 1998
Sharon J. Eblen
Uninsured Employers' Fund
PO Box 146612
Salt Lake City UT 84114-6612
Via facsimile @ 801-530-6804 (one copy)
March 30,1998
J. MacArthur Wright
59 South 100 East
St. George UT 84770

Hand Delivered (one copy)
March 31,1998
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Wendell K. Smith, #3019
Attorney for Complainants
275 East 850 South
Richmond, UT 84333
Telephone: (435) 258-0011
Facsimile: (435) 258-2182

BE* (>KL 1 ill, OH ICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE I TAH STATE BAR

Virginius Dabney, Aaron J.
Prisbrey, and Bruce J. Wilson,

< iiMiplaiiianls,

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS
THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAT
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
UTAH STATE BAR
and
f t iTTION FOR INTERIM
SUSPENSION FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW

vs.

and
Donald L. Georm,
IN

|niiiili nl

IT J ON FOR TRANSFER TO
VB11ITY STATUS

COMPLAINANTS, by and through their attorney, Wendell K. Smith, file the following

Office of Professional Responsibility to file a Petition for the Interim Suspension of Respondent
EXHIBIT "A'

for Threat of Harm in accordance with Rule 18 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability,
and further petitions the Office of Professional Responsibility to file a Petition to transfer
Respondent to disability status in accordance with Rule 23(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability.
STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINT
1.

Respondent is currently an Administrative Law Judge with the Utah Labor

Commission.
2.

Respondent is suffering from a mental condition which adversely affects his

ability to practice law and which renders him incompetent to function as an attorney or an
Administrative Law Judge.
3.

Respondent's lack of mental capacity to practice law, coupled with his position

as an Administrative Law Judge, poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public.
MATTERS IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT
4.

Complainants have been informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that

Respondent suffered a head injury in a auto accident a number of years ago while serving as an
Assistant City Prosecutor in Salt Lake City, UT.
5.

The date of this accident and the exact extent and nature of Respondent's injuries

are unknown to Complainants inasmuch as this confidential information is not available to
Complainants but can be obtained by the Utah State Bar.
6.

Complainants have been informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that

Respondent's head injuries rendered him incompetent to practice law and that the Salt Lake City

2

Prosecutor's office attempted to remove Respondent from his position due to his inability to
perform his job competently.
7.

Complainants have been informed and believe, and thereupon allege, that the Salt

Lake City Prosecutor's Office did not pursue the termination of Respondent's employment as a
City Prosecutor because he asserted he was entitled to the protections afforded him in the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in that his inability to effectively function as a City
Prosecutor was due to short term memory loss, and other head injuries, he suffered in the auto
accident.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1. and incorporated herein by reference, is the

Affidavit of Virginius Dabney. In his Affidavit Mr. Dabney sets forth the factual basis upon
which it can be concluded that Mr. George is mentally incompetent to function as an attorney.
Mr. Dabney gives chilling examples of Respondent's incompetence in the adjudication of
Worker's Compensation claims. Mr. Dabney practices almost exclusively before the Utah
Labor Commission, yet he is willing to make this Affidavit knowing the adverse affect it could
have upon his relationship with Respondent, the Utah Labor Commission, the insurance industry
and the Defense Bar before whom and with whom he must continue to practice. This lends great
credibility to the Affidavit of Mr. Dabney.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2. and incorporated herein by reference, is the

Affidavit of Bruce J. Wilson. In his Affidavit Mr. Wilson also cites examples of Respondent's
mental incompetence. The Affidavit of Mr. Wilson corroborates the Affidavit of Mr. Dabney.
Mr. Wilson, like Mr. Dabney, is willing to put his worker's compensation practice at risk for the
good and protection of the public.
3

10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 3. and incorporated herein by reference, is the

Affidavit of Aaron J. Prisbrey. This attorney, like Mr. Dabney and Mr. Wilson, is willing to put
his Worker's Compensation practice at risk for the good and protection of the public.

WITNESSES
1.
Commissioner R. Lee Ellertson, 160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake City,
UT 84114. (Current Commissioner of the Utah Labor Commission)
2.
Mr. Thomas R. Carlson, 160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake City, UT
84114. (Former Commissioner of the Utah Industrial Commission)
3.
Mrs. Colleen S. Colton, 160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84114.
(Former Commissioner of the Utah Industrial Commission)
4.
Hon. Benjamin A. Sims, 160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake City, UT
84114. (Current Administrative Law Judge and former Chief Administrative Law Judge
of at the Utah Labor Commission)
5.
Timothy C. Allen, 350 South 400 East, #113, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
(Former Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Utah Labor Commission.)
6.
Robert J. Shaughnessy, 1685 South 35 East, Bountiful, UT 84010.
(Former Administrative Law Judge of the Utah Labor Commission)

•

7.
David W. Parker, 50 West 300 South, #900, Salt Lake City, UT 84101.
(Workers Compensation attorney who represents disabled workers)
8.
Hans M. Scheffler, 311 South State, #380, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
(Workers Compensation Attorney who represents disabled workers)
9.
Patrick J. O'Connor, 9164 Scirlein Dr. Sandy, UT 84094.
(Injured Worker's Association of Utah)
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APPLICABLE RULES
Rule 1 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
The attached Affidavits establish that Respondent due to his demanded mental capacity, cannot
meet the standards of professional competency required by attorneys by this Rule.
Rule 18 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Rule 18(b) provides for the immediate interim suspension from the practice of law of an
attorney. An interim suspension under this Rule is appropriate where an attorney poses a
substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public. It is not necessary that an attorney have
committed any violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in order to be suspended from the
practice of law pursuant to this Rule. An attorney is subject to interim suspension if the attorney
is under a disability as defined in the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. Such disability
is defined in Rule 23(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability as a physical or mental
condition which adversely affects the lawyer's ability to practice law. Complainants request that
the Office of Professional Responsibility promptly refer this matter to the District Court for a
determination of Respondent's mental capacity to continue to practice law. This action needs to
be taken promptly because Respondent is in a position to continue to do irreparable harm to a
substantial segment of the public.
Rule 23 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
Rule 23(c) provides that the Bar shall conduct an investigation upon receiving
information relating to a lawyer's physical or mental condition which adversely affects the
lawyer's ability to practice law and, where warranted, initiate formal proceedings to determine
whether the lawyer shall be transferred to disability status. Complainants request that a Petition
5

to place Respondent on disability status be promptly filed regardless of whether he is placed on
interim suspension. This prompt action is necessary to protect the public from irreparable harm.
CONCLUSION
Respondent poses a clear and present danger of irreparable harm to the public. Steps
should be immediately taken to place him on interim suspension and to place him on disability
status until such time as it is determined that he can, if ever, return to the practice of law.
DATED this 27th day of March, 1998.

Wendell K. Smith
Counsel for Complainants
VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Virginius Dabney, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and states that he is one of
the Complainants in the foregoing Complaiat; that he has read the contents thereof; and that the
statements contained therein are true to the best of his knowtedgerinfbrmatior

VirMfaiu^ Dabney
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th|day of March,
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I ! ffii&ii - s^'1 u * p c,tv
v* % * ' i l 2 r
^»«f*

+J
^

utah &4111

^ y C:r-rr-ijs 0 nn Expires
Sia'e of Utah

I
|

i
•

lW ^

1II

VIRGINIUS DABNEY #795
BARBARA DABNEY #794
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St. George, Utah 84770
4

sI

Telephone: (435) 652-8500
Facsimile: (435) 652-8599
E-Mail: DabneyLAW@sginet.com

UTAH STATE BAR
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Petition in re:
AFFIDAVIT

7
DONALD L. GEORGE,

Of

momm DABNEY

8
Respondent.
9
10

COMES NOW Virginius Dabney, a member of the Utah State Bar for almost 25 years,
11
and files this Affidavit regarding the qualifications of Donald L. George to continue to be an
12

active licensed member of the Bar, and in support thereof alleges and represents as follows:
13
1.

That Donald L. George [hereafter "Respondent"] has been an employee of the

14
Labor Commission of Utah for almost ten years and has continuously since that time served
15

as an Administrative Law Judge thereof.

16

2.

That Affiant believes that Respondent is unqualified to continue to be an active,

17 j
licensed member of the Bar for at least three reasons:
18
a.

Respondent is under the influence of a mental disability.

b.

Respondent is incompetent.

c.

Respondent harbors a bias against disabled injured workers.

19
20
21
3.
23
24

25 I

26 I
27
28

That as a result of the above deficiencies, Respondent is incapable of

performing his duties as a lawyer and as an Administrative Law Judge, and should be
considered medically disabled from continuing to be an active, licensed member of the Bar.
4.

That Respondent was previously employed by Salt Lake City, and while in their

employ was questioned concerning his competence and inability to perform his duties as an
Assistant City Prosecutor; and in fact left his employment with Salt Lake City under

1

1
2

unfavorable circumstances.
5.

That Respondent has both defended his working difficulties arguing that he

3

needs training and assistance to do his job because of his mental disabilities; and subsequently

4

denied in a specific case that he suffers from short term memory loss at all. Patten v. Wal-

5

mart Distribution Center, Case Number 9714.

6

6.

That Respondent suffers from short term memory loss, and as a result, relies

7

heavily if not exclusively on depositions taken prior to hearing, tapes of hearings and proffered

8

drafted orders following hearings in ruling on industrial claims.

9

7.

That Respondent has repeatedly, particularly over the last five years,

10

demonstrated his incompetence in the industrial arena as evidenced by his inability and

11

unwillingness to draft his own orders as all other Administrative Law Judges commonly do,

12

and has routinely assigned his order drafting duties to defense counsel which results in an

13

inordinately high percentage of benefit denials.

14

8.

That Respondent is unable because of his mental deficiencies to draft Findings

15

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orders in industrial cases, and has continuously and

16

repeatedly failed and refused to do so even though the drafting of these pleadings is an

17

inherent requirement of his position as an Administrative Law Judge.

18

9.

That Respondent has further demonstrated his incompetence through errors in

19

judgement, interpretation of law and ability to rationally weigh questions of law, fact and

20

mixed questions of law and fact.

21

10.

That Respondent during the course of his employment with the Labor

22

Commission has over the last several years repeatedly and consistently exhibited an anti-

23

injured worker attitude to the point where he now has a reputation for denying what many

24

believe to be valid industrial claims; has exhibited his antipathy for injured worker's in

25

conducting both formal and informal conferences and hearings; and has further conducted

26

himself in an incompetent manner to the point where he has been and continues to be a

27

continuing embarrassment to the Labor Commission.

28
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resolve medical issues which caused the injured w o r k e r ' s attorney to argue m his Motion to

18

Recuse Respondent tVnrn Ihornso, llu: fnlliMvini'

19 I
20 ||

It is very apparent that after almost three years of employment,
numerous
rr^rsals on his inability to understand what facts are, attendance at the Compensation
ge leads one to the conclusion that the Administrative Law Judge does not
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Time and. experience have not changed this short coming. What is difficult for
Applicant's counsel to understand is why the commission stands for ihese conditions
to continue.
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1

15.

That as a result of these and other cases Affiant has made a concerted effort to

2

avoid any more hearings with Respondent, which such action he deems essential in order to

3

avoid having his clients subject their claim to a mentally disabled, incompetent and prejudiced

4

Administrative Law Judge.

5

16.

That a former Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Labor Commission, who

6

was instrumental at the request of the Labor Commission in attempting to have Respondent's

7

employment terminated, has been removed from Respondent's cases while all other injured

8

worker's counsel are not so fortunate.

9

17.

That at least three well known Defense counsel, when they learned of

10

Respondent's having submitted his resignation following the Labor Commission's first attempt

11

to terminate his employment, urged him to withdraw his resignation, which eventually he did,

12

the result of which was that he was able to preserve his position because of the State merit

13

system; and, as a result of defense counsel's personal involvement in Respondent's threatened

14

unemployment concerns, Respondent now feels a personal obligation to them because of his

15

perception that they in essence saved his job.

16

18.

That because of Respondent's medical disability, incompetence and prejudice

17

against the disabled and injured workers in the state of Utah are precluded from obtaining a

18

fair and impartial hearing before Respondent, and that has been the case for at least five years

19

and perhaps throughout Respondent's tenure as an Administrative Law Judge of the Labor

20

Commission.

21

19.

That the Labor Commission, notwithstanding substantial evidence and numerous

22

complaints by members of the public, as well as employees within the Labor Commission, has

23

failed to satisfactorily address, evaluate, consider and remedy what has been known and

24

commonly referred to in the Labor Commission as "the Judge George problem."

25

20.

That while other states, such as New Jersey, have adopted statutory and/or

26

regulatory guidelines governing the conduct and discipline of workers compensation

27 I

Administrative Law Judges, Utah through its Labor Commission unfortunately has not, and,

28
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DATED this 2r*

YERIEICAIliitt
I, Virginius Dabney, Affiant herein, hereby adaiowledge that the/foregoing
representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and/oelief

20
21

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th da> of MarcX_N98.
DAVID W. JOHNSON/1
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AFFIDAVIT

I am Bruce Wilson. I am an attorney and have made my living in a Utah workers'
compensation practice since 1983, when I started as house counsel for the workers'
compensation fund. Though I quit that job and attended school full time between 1986
and 1990 when I graduated, I continued to support my family as an attorney, primarily
doing plaintiff cases in workers' compensation. Since January 1991 I have represented
workers' compensation claimants almost exclusively.
Since 1991 I recall only one case decided by Donald George in which I prevailed.
That was a case where after I had gotten benefits for a client, the client challenged my
right to attorney fees. I was granted the fee by Judge George.
It is with great hesitancy that I write this. I like Don George as a person. I know
he supports a family. But I have seen other families devastated by his failure as a judge. It
is not my opinion that Judge George is intentionally biased, though that is a possibility. I
believe he accommodates his inability to comprehend and evaluate complex factual and
legal problems by adopting some fairly simple mental procedures or rubrics that he knows
by experience give him the least trouble personally. Among those rubrics are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

base findings on credibility.
deny applicant claims
let the defense prepare the order,
attorney conferences don't leave a record.

When I, along with two other attorneys went to Commissioner Hadley privately to
discuss problems with Judge George, some effort was made at that time to evaluate and
alleviate the problems, but that was not successful. Some days, or a week or so following
this meeting, Commissioner Hadley stopped me at the commission and told me privately
that Judge George had had an accident with brain injury for which he had been in therapy.
He attributed some of the problems to that injury and tried to assure me that the situation
had gotten better. This was the first time I heard of any accident, injury or therapy. I
have never tried to confirm that, nor have I heard it from any other source.
Two or three years later, I contacted Judge Sims after a particularly bad decision
and asked if he would look into whether Judge George had heard I had gone to Commissioner Hadley to complain about him and that might be the reason I was consistently
losing cases heard by Judge George. I recall Judge Sims went through every case he could
find through his computer, which I believe was 17 and showed me one case where my
client had been awarded benefits. I pointed out that was actually a stipulated agreement
that was put in the form of an order by Judge George. Though Judge Sims could find no
cases where my client had won a favorable decision before Judge George, he did not think
there was a problem and declined to take him off my cases as I had requested.
1

1 osing cases has not been the only problem. 1 recognize losses and w r i s wA*n aL
tne judges. The problem with Judge George is the kind of cases and the reasons tor the
losses. M y perception is he never addresses the issues presented in any coherent manner.
Instead, he states a simplistic premise, marginally relevant, usually making a finding against
the applicant based on lack of credibility.
.... eic.iudULi have caught on,, to this and credibility is always brought up as an issue •
before judge George. Whether it is reasonable or not, he usually picks up the credibility
issue, then makes his finding based on that. One case I had challenged the validity of a
settlement. My client had not been represented at the time, and I had argued that the
adjuster had denied benefits without substantial justification, misrepresented some
significant facts and told my client the paper he was signing was necessary before he could
get benefits. When I had asked my client to read the agreement to me and explain its
meaning, it was clear he had no idea what he had signed. My client had left work middle
of the day and was taken to the hospital where 'there was clear evidence of a herniated disc.
This gave the adjuster good reason to believe the injury was serious and would lead to an
expensive claim. I argued that the adjuster, knowing these tacts, tried to minimize losses
by settling this claim for something like $1500.00, knowing the claimant had a serious and
legitimate claim for much more than that. Following this settlement, the worker we"'
three years being unable to work and unable to get medical care, and he needed .<
I thought the defense argued an excellent argument and presented hersei: well on
the issues. Judge George took a recess, went and obtained some 10-year-old injury reports
and started questioning my client about these claims. O n one of them he had an injury
and spent a night in the hospital tor observation and was released and had no residual
problems. My client said he didn't think that was a significant injury. The judge asked
what he thought was significant, and he sani ongoing symptoms that require surgery.
Judge George then found my client was not credible because he conQuCi-a inm any
injury that resulted in a night .in the hospital was significant, He then went on to find that
we had no case because in fact no accident ever occurred, My client had never hrted heavy
chunks of concrete and thus no accident ever occurred. I was dumbfounded be. ause.
though the credibility of my client had been raised, his leaving in the middle or the day
and going to the hospital in such pain that he couldn't even drive himself and finding in
the hospital clear evidence of a herniated disc showed substantial support for the fact that
something had occurred on the job.
. . . . . . '
This was a case I could have lost _ „;_ \ ahuii) . . :4*c <. d e m e n t , but i; e
credibility issue was very weak and only very marginal at best. Following this decision,
Ji ldge George asked the defense to prepare the ^n:e: T**e o i d c presented numerous
i easons for the decision, I don't recall \l\e order even mentioning credibility
' :.:^-( jeorge adopted the defendant's order and signed it as his own. The result was a decision
made on a very poorly supported basis of credibility that was rendered unappealable bv ?,
carefully written order by the defense based on arguments that Judge George never
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considered at the hearing and showed no evidence of being able to comprehend.
A similar case involved a documented incident on the job, with records made
concurrently describing the accident. What my client had thought was a neck strain
turned out later to be a herniated disc requiring surgery. Witnesses described facts that
easily could have caused the neck injury the applicant claimed. Judge George sat through
the testimony apparently listening, then totally surprised me by saying he had observed the
demeanor of m y client through the hearing, that he was squirming in his seat (which was
clearly reasonable considering the spine injury) and that his squirming and moving around
in his seat during testimony indicated that the applicant was lying, therefore the claim was
denied for lack of credibility. This totally surprised me because the witnesses appeared to
me t o be totally straight forward, sincere and believable.
Decisions like this are not the only problem. T h e very fact that Judge George is
assigned creates a basis for compromise. I had one case in which my client had been
declared totally disabled by Social Security. His treating doctor indicated the patient was
disabled because of his industrial injuries. The insurance doctors agreed with the treating
doctor. Yet, the defense attorney demanded compromise by reducing the lifetime monthly
benefit, otherwise he wouldn't agree to settle. I said I could not compromise a case when
they had presented absolutely no evidence to justify any compromise. His response was "I
have D o n George."
This action by this attorney was totally obnoxious to me. Yet, that was his
position and he insisted on a reduction in benefits or he would go to hearing. As I
discussed this with my client, I felt I had to advise him of my experience with Judge
George's proven ability to find against applicants even with no evidence against them. I
had to advise him to accept the reduction.
Unfortunately, I have had to compromise other cases that were scheduled with
Judge George much more than I would consider reasonable based on the facts of the case
alone.
The following is one more example. It shows another practice Judge George has
used, that of scheduling an attorney conference where he announces his intention to find
against you in order to force you to settlement. This example was written just after it
occurred when the facts were fresh in my mind. Since then I have only edited briefly,
adding comments in brackets to make it more comprehensible and taking out the names of
the client and attorney.
Mr. A - A N EXAMPLE of D O N G E O R G E AS ALJ
I represented Mr. A in a case where he was denied a medical panel hearing even
though he had two treating doctors giving ratings respectively of 10% and 15% and the
defense offered no medical evidence to the contrary. The judge [not Judge George] found a

3

rating of 5% was reasonable, without supporting evidence. O n appeal, the commission
found the ALJ's findings supported by "substantial e\ idence" and refused to overturn.
d remanded for consideration and findings based on a
"preponderance standard, but failed to reverse the failure to send the matter to a medical
panel. This was appealed to the Supreme Court. I discovered six months after, by calling
the court clerk that cert, had been denied, but no notice of this had been sent to me. In
the meantime, cert, had been accepted on the Willardson case, which had almost exactly
the same fact situation and the issue was failure to send to a medical panel when the
applicant's doctor had raised an issue of dispute with a document that [gave a rating that]
"lacked adequate explanation" ano *A * ; :erefore rejected as not raising an issue for -h-*
panel. ["This ^ -, ;;;? same a^ mv case Consequently I did r t pursue the a : : %!- A.
11

..... . * *.**.* .ViiJi and was Gvmv. J_W.- ., ^ i . m$ ^d:^- wi5 1
j „:. . .
pursue it feeling the benefit would be marginal without the medical p ; 111:1 ill issi 1 2
Later Mr. A's chiropractor contacted me about his bill After consulting with IV Ir.
A and with his permission, I represented the chiropractor in making a claim for his bill of
about $1400. Mr. A told me at the time that all he wanted was to have this bill paid,
because he could not do it. [I don't believe the issue of the chiropractor's treatment 01 I: il 1
had been considered in the prior case.]
i niacc a ^idiiii LU irii: insurance company for the bil 1. I he adjuster was very rude
and.just said nr Cnnsenuervlv [ filed for a hearing
•:. the meantime, the Supreme Court ruling in Willardson came down favorable to
Mr. A's case. I reported this to Mr. A, and at that point he felt some hope that on remand
he would have a fair chance because the "Willardson case would require that they send his
case to a medical panel.
Because of this and because the adjuster had been so rude, Mr A requested we file
his claims as well. I filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits for Mi A, because
we had evidence from his doctor, that the AIDS did not prevent him from working, the
spine injury did, and the issue of P T D had never been raised in the prior matter. We also
wanted on remand for the other issues to be reconsidered first based on the proper
standard of proof and second based on the rule in Willardson, which we felt required
referral to a medical panel on the remand.
After Judge Sims declined to deal with this case, it was assigned to judge George. A
hearing was scheduled for the permanent total disability claim in St. George. The claim, of
the chiropractor and the remand were separate matters and no hearing had been set as yet.
I wrote a motion that all of the three cases be joined.
At this point, I received a phone call from D o n George. Mr. D , the defense counsel

was on the line when he called. D o n George informed me that he wanted t o discuss the
motion to join the three matters. Within the first few seconds of this call, Judge George
informed me that he had read the file and agreed with the findings of the commission.
[These are the findings the appeals court had remanded.] I began to discuss the standard of
proof, the fact that the IME doctor [whose file review was admitted over m y objection and
became the basis for the commission findings] had never examined the patient, never heard
his side of the story, and that he didn't have all of the medical file when he gave his
opinion. Specifically, I said he did not have the records of the chiropractor, whose bill was
in question. N o r had the IME doctor commented on important issues in question such as
need for chiropractic and he had not given a rating, which was also in issue. We also discussed the finding in Willardson, which we felt was a rule binding on the commission in
this case, requiring that the matter be submitted to a medical panel, which had not been
done.
It is obvious there are some complex issues in this case. During all of this
discussion, Judge George never responded in any way that would indicate he understood
the issues or was analyzing them. After every comment or argument he would turn to
Mr. D and ask him to respond. That could be interpreted as simply requesting counter
argument, but he never commented on the arguments or said anything that would indicate
he understood the nature of the issues. He simply informed me that he agreed with the
original ALJ and the commission and that was going to be his findings. In other words, he
never acknowledged any argument, but simply informed me I was wrong on every point
and my client had already lost.
I also argued that the chiropractor had a right to pursue his case separately based on
a letter I had from the commission on that issue. Mr. D disagreed and Judge George
agreed with him. [The commission had given a written opinion indicating the chiropractor
could file a separate claim under U C A 35-1-45, which says the medical provider's claim is
against the employer and not the employee. Based on that we filed a claim in the name of
the chiropractor. Judge George was adopting the defense position saying we couldn't do
that. He did, however, ask for a copy of the commission letter. After filing the chiropractor's claim, Mr. A filed a request for reconsideration of prior issues in accordance with
the remand from the appeals court and a separate and new claim for total disability, which
had never been considered. I had made a motion that these three cases be consolidated.]
After I had exhausted every argument on the issues (which are described in my
motions in that file) and when I saw there was no hope of convincing him t o either
reconsider the evidence based on a preponderance, [as required by the remand order] or
send it to a medical panel [as required by the Willardson decision], I finally asked whether
we would join the three claims at the hearing in St. George.
Judge George then informed me he saw no evidence justifying a finding of PTD
[permanent total disability]. I pointed out that the hearing on that issue had not been held
and no evidence had been offered, of course there was no evidence yet, but we would
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present it at the appropriate time. [Judge George still persisted, several times insisting that
he didn't see evidence for total disability, though I thin k at the end he started showing
signs that he realized the hearing hadn't been held yet so he shouldn't be pushing his
decision,]
I think Mr. D realized he was going to be reversed on appeal even though he was
prevailing on every issue in this discussion with Don. George. He suggested before we
hung up that we could consider settling,
Mr. D offered $3000 to settle. Mr. A accepted, since the Judge already :.J.U .
was going to lose and all he had originally wanted was the $1400 chiropractor bill.

;

Tins .is not the only time judge George has done this kind of "attorney conference"
decision, without evidence and without a record.
That is the end of my memo on the case of Mr. A.
It .is extremely frustrating
• ^ argue a case before judge George. You never
::er. dnv feedback that shows any comprehension of what is going on. You get to hear the
.i>e argue and judge George telling you he agrees with, them, but he doesn't respond in
any way :hat shows comprehension or the issues. I am convinced a coin, toss gives you a
K^rrer chance to win than an assignment to Judge George. But losing is not the issue so
\n; someone loses every case. The problem is the basis for the loss being less than
*. uiirary, not connected to law, facts, or rational decision making, except to the extent
there is a rationale behind the rubrics he appears to use, as shown in the above examples
r
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AARON J. PRISBREY & ASSOCIATES P.C.
Aaron J. Prisbrey #6968
Eric S. Lind #7920
135 North 900 East, Suite 4
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone 435/673-1661
Facsimile 435/673-3561

UTAH STATE BAR

PETITION IN RE:
DONALD L. GEORGE

AFFIDAVIT OF
AARON J. PRISBREY

AARON J. PRISBREY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1.

That affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, and is

competent to testify regarding the ability of Donald L. George (hereafter "Respondent") to
continue as an active member of the Utah State Bar.
2. That Respondent is employed by the Labor Commission of Utah as an Administrative
Law Judge. Affiant has tried at least five cases with Respondent and had dealings with
Respondent on multiple others.
3. That based upon his experiences with Respondent, affiant believes Respondent is
unqualified to continue as an active member of the Utah State Bar because Respondent is not
mentally capable of performing his job duties and has a bias against injured workers. Affiant has
observed the following which makes it appaient Respondent is laboring under a disability and
has a bias toward injured workers:

a. A ij respondent's practice to request discovery depositions and read them in
advance of trial. As these are discover}"" depositions, not evidentiary depositions,
Affiant has objected to this practice, and has informed Respondent of the same.
Nevertheless, Respondent continues with the practice. In a recent telephone
conversation between Respondent, affiant and defense counsel, affiant informed
p
^nondent he had objected to a discovery deposition being delivered to Respondent
_: ;_jnt an appropriate motion to publish the deposition, Respondent then ordered
defense counsel to file a motion to publish so the deposition would be delivered to
Respondent prior to hearing'
b. Respondent is the only Administrative Law" Judge affiant has ever seen delegate
his decision making duties to attorneys. Respondent usually has defense counsel draft
his orders, with little or no guidance. Affiant has seen Respondent simply indicate
that he is adopting the closing arguments of defense counsel and then order defense
counsel to draft a final order consistent with defense counsel's closing arguments.
c. Affiant has .knowledge of only one order actually drafted by Respondent. The
order was so lacking in substance that it is not sufficient to create a record on appeal.
Respondent refused to address seven witnesses that testified on behalf of the injured
worker. He simply indicated that "[bjased on the representations of the applicant
alone, I find her not to be a credible witness
and 'the testimony of other
witnesses as to the circumstances of the accident will be disregarded."
d. As he has difficult}'7' recalling events at hearing, Respondent engager u: L •.« .
investigation of cases. Affiant has knowledge of one case where, without pp. knowledge or consent of counsel, Respondent compiled evidence of an injuiv;^
worker's past workers compensation claims.
e. Affiant represented an injured worker who had mad-, i v pi u •• work related
accidents, most of which were minor. Only one of the claims had been adjudicated
and was found to be compensable. Nevertheless, Respondent denied benefits, in part,
because the injured 'worker had filed previous valid claims.
f. Affiant has requested Respondent exclude witnesses at hearing as provided under
the Rules of Evidence. This claim has been denied by Respondent.
on injured worker, affiant observed Respondent order
^,cu>c « _.. ^wui the order consistent with the closing -arguments of defense
counsel. Houexer. the final order was dissimilar to closing arguments. Nevertheless,
Respondent signed the order before affiant was given a chance to object.
-uiiaiit h.
respondent take an inordinate amount of time in examining
witnesses anu
i.u^ung questions at hearing. This causes affiant to believe
Respondent has severe mental disabilities Because of th is problem,, most of the
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hearings affiant has had with Respondent have gone way over the time allotted.
i. On one occasion, an employer was more than thirty days overdue in responding to
an application for hearing. Affiant asked the clerk to enter the employer's default.
Some ninety days later affiant again made this request of the judge handling the case.
Without addressing the merits of the request for default, and not being the assigned
judge, Respondent granted a continuance which gave the employer over a five month
extension to answer.
4. That affiant believes the conduct of Respondent would violate the judicial canons
regarding competency of a judge. However, affiant has been informed by Kay Carlson at the
Judicial Conduct Commission that the Judicial Conduct Commission does not have jurisdiction
over Administrative Law Judges.
5. That the Labor Commission of Utah does not have any procedures in place to deal with
the incompetency of an Administrative Law Judge
6. That if Respondent is permitted to hear workers compensation cases that immediate and
irreparable injury will occur to injured workers because of Respondents disabilities and biases.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
On the 2-ls day of March, 1998, personally appeared before me Aaron J. Prisbrey, the
signer of the foregoing Affidavit of Aaron J. Prisbrey, who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
KIM LOFTHOUSE
HOTWPUBLIC* STATEoWTAH
135 NORTH 900 EAST STE#4
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